Wednesday 14 December 2022

#7/22美联储FED加息0.50%

 Source: 美联储利率决议:加息幅度降至50基点 点阵图路径明显拔高_新浪财经_新浪网 (sina.com.cn)

北京时间周四凌晨3点,美联储联邦公开市场委员会发布最新的利率决议。与市场预期一致,继此前连续四次加息75个基点后,本次会议FOMC将加息幅度放缓至50个基点,联邦基金利率区间由此上调至4.25%-4.50%,达到2007年12月以后的最高值。美联储同时宣布继续按照设定的路径展开缩表操作。

12月13日,美国劳工统计局数据显示,美国11月CPI同比增长7.1%,低于10月为7.7%,增速超预期下行,连续5个月回落,为2021年12月以来的最低同比增幅。同时,美国11月核心CPI同比增长6%,连续两个月超预期放缓,前值为6.3%。










Source: 美联储如期加息50个基点:预计继续加息将是合适的(附声明)_金改实验室_澎湃新闻-The Paper

本次会议上的所有美联储公开市场委员会(FOMC)票委全票通过了加息50个基点的决议。

以下为声明全文及与11月声明的比较:

最近的支出和生产指标增长温和。近几个月就业增长强劲,失业率保持低位。通胀仍居高不下,反映出与新冠疫情,更高的食品、能源价格和更广泛的价格压力有关的供需失衡。

俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争正在造成巨大的人员和经济困难。战争和相关事件正在加剧通货膨胀的上行压力(11月原文:战争和相关事件对通货膨胀造成了额外的压力),并对全球经济活动造成压力。委员会高度关注通胀风险。

委员会力图在长期内达成最大就业和2%的通胀目标。为了支持这些目标,委员会决定将联邦基金利率的目标区间上调至4.25%-4.5%(11月原文:3.75%-4%)。委员会预计继续上调目标区间将是合适的,以保持货币政策立场有足够的限制性,使通胀随着时间推移回落到2%。为了判断未来目标范围的上升节奏,委员会将考虑货币政策的累积紧缩、货币政策影响经济活动和通胀的滞后性,以及经济和金融形势变化。此外,委员会将继续减持美国国债、机构债务和机构抵押贷款支持证券,这在5月发布的缩减美联储资产负债表规模的计划中有所描述。委员会坚定致力于将通胀率恢复至2%这一目标。

在评估合适的货币政策立场时,委员会将继续监控未来的经济数据的影响。如果风险的发生会阻碍达成委员会的双重目标,委员会会为调整适当的货币政策立场做好准备。委员会的评估将考虑到大量信息,包括公共卫生、劳动力市场指标、通胀压力和通胀预期指标、金融和国际形势发展的数据等。

投票赞成者包括:FOMC委员会主席(美联储主席)鲍威尔(Jerome H. Powell, Chairman);委员会副主席(纽约联储主席)威廉姆斯( John C. Williams, Vice Chairman); (美联储理事)Michael S. Barr;(美联储理事)Michelle W. Bowman;(美联储理事)Lael Brainard;(圣路易联储主席)James Bullard;(波士顿联储主席) Susan M. Collins;(美联储理事)Lisa D.Cook;(堪萨斯联储主席)Esther L. George; (美联储理事)Philip N.Jefferson;(克利夫兰联储主席)Loretta J. Mester;(美联储理事)Christopher J. Waller。

December 14, 2022

Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement

For release at 2:00 p.m. EST

Recent indicators point to modest growth in spending and production. Job gains have been robust in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Inflation remains elevated, reflecting supply and demand imbalances related to the pandemic, higher food and energy prices, and broader price pressures.

Russia's war against Ukraine is causing tremendous human and economic hardship. The war and related events are contributing to upward pressure on inflation and are weighing on global economic activity. The Committee is highly attentive to inflation risks.

The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent. The Committee anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate in order to attain a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent over time. In determining the pace of future increases in the target range, the Committee will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in May. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective.

In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals. The Committee's assessments will take into account a wide range of information, including readings on public health, labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial and international developments.

Voting for the monetary policy action were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michael S. Barr; Michelle W. Bowman; Lael Brainard; James Bullard; Susan M. Collins; Lisa D. Cook; Esther L. George; Philip N. Jefferson; Loretta J. Mester; and Christopher J. Waller.

For media inquiries, please email media@frb.gov or call 202-452-2955.

Implementation Note issued December 14, 2022

Monday 7 November 2022

#4/22大马国行加息0.25%

马来西亚国家银行11月3日宣布加息25个基点,将隔夜政策利率(Overnight Policy Rate)从2.50%调升至2.75%。11月19日是GE15。

Reference:https://www.bnm.gov.my/-/monetary-policy-statement-03112022

At its meeting today, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of Bank Negara Malaysia decided to increase the Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) by 25 basis points to 2.75 percent. The ceiling and floor rates of the corridor of the OPR are correspondingly increased to 3.00 percent and 2.50 percent, respectively.

The global economy continues to be weighed down by rising cost pressures, tighter global financial conditions, and strict containment measures in China. These factors more than offset the support from positive labour market conditions, and the full reopening of most economies and international borders. Inflationary pressures were more persistent than expected due to strong demand, tight labour markets, and elevated commodity prices, despite improvements in global supply chain conditions. Consequently, many central banks are expected to continue raising interest rates to manage inflationary pressures. In particular, continued aggressive adjustments in US interest rates and expectations of a higher terminal rate in the US, have contributed to a persistently strong US dollar environment. This has resulted in higher volatility in financial markets, affecting other major and emerging market currencies, including the ringgit. Going forward, the global growth outlook will continue to face headwinds from tighter financial conditions amid elevated inflation in major economies and the domestic challenges in China. The growth outlook remains subject to downside risks, including escalation of geopolitical tensions, worsening of domestic headwinds in China and potential energy rationing in Europe.

For the Malaysian economy, latest indicators show that economic activity strengthened further in the third quarter, driven primarily by robust domestic demand. Going forward, despite the challenging global environment, domestic demand will remain the key driver of growth. Household spending will continue to be underpinned by improvements in labour market conditions and income prospects. Tourist arrivals have increased following the reopening of international borders and will further lift tourism-related sectors. Investment activity and prospects will be supported by the realisation of multi-year projects. Nevertheless, external demand is expected to moderate following softening global growth. Despite bouts of heightened volatility in the global financial and foreign exchange markets, these developments are not expected to derail Malaysia's growth. Domestic liquidity remains sufficient, with continued orderly functioning of the financial and foreign exchange markets. Financial institutions also continue to operate with strong capital and liquidity buffers. These will ensure financial intermediation remains supportive of the economy. Downside risks to the domestic economy continue to stem from a weaker-than-expected global growth, higher risk aversion in global financial markets amid more aggressive monetary policy tightening in major economies, further escalation of geopolitical conflicts, and worsening supply chain disruptions.

In line with earlier assessments, headline inflation is likely to have peaked in 3Q 2022 and is expected to moderate thereafter, albeit remaining elevated. Underlying inflation, as measured by core inflation, is projected to average closer to the upper end of the 2.0% - 3.0% forecast range in 2022, having averaged 2.7% year-to-date, given some demand-driven price pressures amid the high-cost environment. Moving into 2023, headline and core inflation are expected to remain elevated amid both demand and cost pressures, as well as any changes to domestic policy measures. The extent of upward pressures to inflation will remain partly contained by existing price controls, subsidies, and the remaining spare capacity in the economy. The balance of risk to the inflation outlook in 2023 is tilted to the upside and continues to be subject to domestic policy measures on subsidies, as well as global commodity price developments arising mainly from the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine and prolonged supply-related disruptions.

Against the backdrop of continued positive growth prospects for the Malaysian economy, the MPC decided to further adjust the degree of monetary accommodation. The adjustment would also pre-emptively manage the risk of excessive demand on price pressures consistent with the recalibration of monetary policy settings that balances the risks to domestic inflation and sustainable growth. At the current OPR level, the stance of monetary policy remains accommodative and supportive of economic growth. The MPC is not on any pre-set course, which means that monetary policy decisions will continue to depend on evolving conditions and their implications on the overall outlook to domestic inflation and growth. Any adjustments to the monetary policy settings going forward would continue to be done in a measured and gradual manner, ensuring that monetary policy remains accommodative to support sustainable economic growth in an environment of price stability.

The meeting also approved the schedule of MPC meetings for 2023. In accordance with the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, the MPC will convene six times during the year. The Monetary Policy Statement will be released at 3 p.m. on the final day of each MPC meeting.

国家银行也公布2023年6次会议的时间。 



#6/22美联储FED加息0.75%

大马时间11月3日凌晨2点,美联储宣布连续第4次加息75个基点,将政策利率联邦基金利率的目标区间从3.00%至3.25%上调到3.75%至4.00%。

鲍威尔的记者招待会,有发新闻演讲稿和问答题。一共有23页。哇靠,本来要抄下来,记录在这篇文章,都不可以。 现在需要读,然后列下重点。 

鲍威尔的演讲稿主要内容。 

  1. 美联储坚决致力于降低通货膨胀,强烈承诺将压低美国通胀至2%这一目标。他认为,当前美国商品和服务领域的物价上涨压力仍然突出。
  2. 美联储要缩减资产负债表 (QT)。
  3. 美联储加息的力度和时间,会根据市场的数据决定。当通货膨胀降至2%,美联储就会放慢加息的力度。
记者发问,鲍威尔回答的要点

  1. 美联储会看实际利率,以确保通货膨胀降至2%。
  2. 美联储加息需要看3方面。 第一,加息力度有多快。美国从2022年3月开始,强势加息。 第二,要加息多高?这个需要看通货膨胀是否减低至2%。第三,要在新利率保持多久。
  3. 美国的通货膨胀率,已经在过去18月,超过4%。鲍威尔没有直接回答通货膨胀是否根深蒂固。
  4. 美国房地产在疫情后,需求增加和低利率,照成房地产过热。 但是,鲍威尔认为美国房地产的房贷控制好,基本上风险不大。 
  5. 美国的失业率是3.5%,50年来的低点。 鲍威尔说,如果看到工资增加,照成通货膨胀,那么就很严重了。美联储不会让它发生。 









看完新闻稿后,我个人觉得
  • 美联储或央行会人为的插手市场。而且,这还是个长时间的动作。 
  • 如果做企业,控制好杠杆。其实,最好是有能力还清负债,然后有现金流,可以度过这个‘寒冬“。
  • 个人的话,控制好贷款。最好是有能力还清贷款,这样贷款利息增加时,没有对个人产生压力。然后,美联储认为,降低通货膨胀的方法,就是增加失业率。更多的人失业,对需求就会减低,然后降通货膨胀。所以,要有36个月的储备金,就算失业,日子还是可以过。 

Saturday 29 October 2022

#3/22欧洲央行加息0.75%

当地时间10月27日,欧洲央行宣布最新利率决议,决定将三大关键利率上调75个基点,自2022年11月2日起,主要再融资利率、边际借贷利率和存款机制利率分别上调至2.00%、2.25%和1.50%。这是欧洲央行年内第三次加息,也是继9月之后第二次加息75个基点,三次累计加息幅度200个基点。








欧洲央行表示,通货膨胀率仍然过高,并将在较长时期内高于目标水平。9月份,欧元区通胀率达到9.9%。近几个月来,能源和食品价格飙升、供应瓶颈和后疫情需求复苏,导致价格压力扩大,通货膨胀加剧。欧洲央行的货币政策旨在减少对需求的支持,并防范通胀预期持续上升的风险。

在资产购买计划(APP)方面,欧洲央行决定,在开始提高关键利率后的较长一段时间内,继续将根据APP购买的到期证券的本金全额再投资,并且在有必要的任何情况下继续投资,以保持充足的流动性条件和适当的货币政策立场。在紧急抗疫购债计划(PEPP)方面,欧洲央行将根据该方案购买的到期证券的本金再投资,至少到2024年年底。欧洲央行强调,PEPP投资组合的未来退出将设法避免干扰适当的货币政策立场。

除了加息和继续资产购买计划之外,欧洲央行还决定改变第三轮定向长期再融资操作(TLTRO III)的条款和条件,调整适用于TLTRO III的利率,并向银行提供额外的自愿提前还款日期。定向长期再融资操作(TLTRO)是欧洲央行在危机期间为银行提供的低息贷款,在新冠疫情发生后,欧洲央行修改了TLTRO III的条款,以鼓励银行向居民和企业贷款。本次调整的具体内容是,从2022年11月23日到每个未偿还TLTRO III操作的到期日或提前还款日,TLTRO III操作的利率将与这一期间欧洲央行适用的平均关键利率挂钩。

Reference: https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2022-10-28/doc-imqmmthc2438296.shtml










欧洲央行是在2020年,推出“定向长期再融资”项目,以刺激经济。










Reference:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SRoRaaSgK0Y

英国2022年9月金融风暴和首相交替

9月26日-27日,英国国债崩盘。 Youtube上有很多人分享。

最棒的影片是,小Lin说的影片:【深度分析】英国崩盘到底是怎么回事儿?https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h9GZBw4-Ltk

她幽默,影片内容深入浅出,很容易明白。 

1)英国在2022年4月开始经历严重的通货膨胀。 








2)英国央行的主要责任就是确保物价稳定。所以,英国央行实时紧缩政策,连续加息7次。 








3)特斯拉(Liz Truss)政府在9月23日(星期五)推出的“迷你预算”案。“迷你预算”需要英国政府额外举债720亿英镑,这将是英国政府近50年来财政负债的最大增幅。其中,能源津贴会花掉1000亿英镑,降低税务会减少收入450亿。 

英国央行刚刚在9月22日加息50个基点。英国财政大臣夸西·克沃滕表示,“迷你预算”具体措施包括削减国民保险,取消提高公司税收计划,同时削减购买房地产的印花税。此外,英国政府还计划在国内多地建立低税区。英国的失业率低,约在3.5%,减息和补贴会加剧英国的通货膨胀。 

减低最高收入者的税收,更是受到市场强烈的反应。 








4)9月25日(星期一)和9月26日(星期二),英国30年期国债收益率一度飙升34.2个基点至4.75%,正在逼近9月债市抛售风暴的高点。而英国10年期国债收益率则飙升超30个基点,一度升至4.545%,已经超过了9月危机的高点。债券收益率是债券价格的反向指标,债市“抛售潮”中收益率上升意味着券价下跌及债券持有人的账面损失。为此,英国央行不得不紧急干预,购买政府债券释放流动性以消除金融风险。









小Lin说,左右英国英镑的原因,已经不是英国国债利率,而是英国整体经济风险的溢价。 

5)政策不合理,造成投资者失去信心,就抛售英国资产。

另一方面,有些英国养老金是Defined Benefits Pensions,就是让退休者在退休时拿到固定的收益。所以这些养老金有向投资银行购买Liability Driven Instrument来对冲长期利率的波动。

利率上涨,造成养老金需要追加保证金。所以,养老金抛售英国国债,英国国债下跌。 












6)9月28日,英国央行宣布13工作天购买国债(QE)。 大约会花650亿英镑救市。 









7)特斯拉(Liz Truss)在10月20日(星期四)宣布辞职。42岁印度裔的Rishi Sunak在10月25日正式就任首相。

摆在苏纳克面前的挑战包括英国数十年来最严重的经济困境和严重分裂的保守党。

英国央行当地时间10月20日公布第四季度金边债券销售计划,计划从11月1日至12月8日开展8次国债出售,每次规模为7.5亿英镑,出售只集中于短期和中期债券。这意味着年底前共出售60亿英镑债券。明年初的债券出售细节将于今年12月16日公布。

Sunday 23 October 2022

大马2022年至9月对外贸易的表现

10月19日12pm出版的Malaysia External Trade Statistics Bulletin September 2022 

2022年至9月(YTD September 2022)的对外贸易的表现

出口:RM1.159兆 (上升30.3%)

进口:   RM9713亿 (上升36.2%)

贸易总额: RM2.13兆 (上升32.9%)

贸易盈余:  RM1874亿 (上升6.3%)

2022年9月对外贸易的表现

出口:RM1443亿 (上升30.1%) RM144.3 billion 

进口:   RM1126亿 (上升33.0%) RM112.6 billion 

贸易总额: RM2569亿 (上升31.4%) RM256.9 billion

贸易盈余:  RM314亿 (上升20.8%)

和2022年8月相比,9月份的出口增加2.2%,但是入口却减少9.4%。

2022年9月,新加坡和中国是大马两大出口国,占总出口28.5%。 

出口新加坡的产品总价值RM21.0 billion,  年增长29.1%或RM4.7 billion

  • 电子产品electrical & electronic (E&E) products (+RM2.3 billion, +28.3%); 
  • 石油产品petroleum products (+RM1.2 billion, +50.8%) and 
  • 机器和零件machinery, equipment & parts (+RM290.4 million, +26.9%). 
出口中国的产品总价值RM20.1 billion,  年增长8%或RM1.5 billion

  • E&E products (+RM2.1 billion, +36.5%); 
  • liquified natural gas (LNG) (+RM989.0 million, +79.9%) and 
  • palm oil & palm oil-based agriculture products (+RM388.8 million, +40.2%). 




































































































大马9月份入口.
中国和新加坡,也是大马最大的入口国,占总入口的31.2%。
从中国的入口是RM23.8 billion
  • machinery, equipment & parts which increased by 72.7 per cent or RM1.3 billion, 
  • transport equipment (+RM658.8 million, +193.8%); 
  • E&E products (+RM629.8 million, +6.9%) and 
  • chemical & chemical products (+RM575.1 million, +30.3%). 
从新加坡的入口是RM11.3 billion
  • Petroleum products (+RM1.8 billion, +67.3%) and 
  • E&E products (+RM547.3 million, +23.8%)















































































Sunday 16 October 2022

1美元兑换148日元,破1998年8月3日低点

 





























2022年1月3日,1美元兑换 115.307日元

2022年10月16日,1美元兑换148.72日元,贬值29%。 

美元大涨,国际基金抛售日本国债。日本央行继续无限量购买国债,造成日元继续贬值。

日元套息交易是从2000年就开始的交易。 

日本央行要把10年国债利率保持在0.25%。

日本负债率是260%。在零利率的情况,日本政府每年需要那20%的财政收入去还债务利息。如果加息,日本政府的还债压力会增加。 



 





马币也是贬值。1 USD = 4.70198 MYR



Saturday 8 October 2022

天价天然气逼欧洲去工业化


 







天然气是一种较清洁能源。俄罗斯用管道向欧洲提供经济和方便的天然气。 

天然气除了可以用来生产电能。它也是化工厂的原料。 

天然气的价格 Dutch TTF Natural Gas 

2019年10月1日:USD14.196

2020年4月1日:USD6.823

2021年4月1日:USD22.198

2021年6月1日:USD34.913

2021年8月1日:USD49.094

2021年12月1日:USD71.58

2022年2月1日:USD96.974

2022年8月1日:USD238.835

2021年

2021年全球天然气的价格不只突破2019年的价格,而且还一路高涨。 

天然气的价格高涨,因为全球需求增加。因为全世界都在去煤炭,去核能,用天然气产生能源,以达到碳中和。 

天然气的价格低廉。 很多国家都建天然气发电厂,以减低碳排放。天然气发电厂的初期建厂成本较低。

美国在2021年8月停止液岩油的开采。 2021年8月20日,美国宣布制裁北溪2Nord Stream 2。它原来的计划是在2021年9月3日完工。

美国在创造天然气的价值。 需求决定价格。供应决定价格。 俄罗斯可通过北溪2在2022年提供大量的天然气给欧洲。

2021年10月,俄罗斯和乌克兰的局势升温。  

2021年12月CCTV的报道说,全球天然气价格高涨是由3个推手照成

1)全球天然气因为新冠疫情,供应不顺。 LNG船难求。 

2)极端天气。 在英国,风电的发电量,大幅度下降。 挪威的干旱,导致水电的发电量减少。 寒冬酷热的夏天,需要更多的天然气。 

3)各国的天然气储备降低。 

2022年

2022年2月24日,俄罗斯和乌克兰发生战争。 美国和欧洲制裁俄罗斯,不可以和俄罗斯购买石油和天然气。 美国将向欧洲增加150亿立方米的天然气。 

2021年9月29日,瑞典海岸警卫队发现北溪天然气管道第四处泄漏点。鉴于“北溪-1”管道已经停运,“北溪2号”管道更是从未启用。冬天“北溪-1”恢复20%供气的希望落空。

为了弥补天然气量的减少,欧洲LNG(注:LNG为液化天然气,进口的多为“管道天然气”)进口已同比增长60%,主要来源于美国。这使得全球液化天然气基准JKM在2022年平均上涨200%。“管道天然气价格便宜,而且管道都是现成的,全球LNG供应能力确实无法满足欧洲的需求,基建不足。整体而言,要完成基建以及转移供应安排,起码还要3-5年的时间。

德国缺乏处理LNG的气化基础设施。德国为了解决这一短板,已经快速审批了一批海上浮动气化船,但是这些基建需要时间,再快也要到2023年;同样,新能源和煤的补充,同样需要时间,现在如果“断气”,2022年冬天根本来不及。

目前,欧洲LNG进口加工能力相当集中,主要掌握在沿海的英国和西班牙手上,这两个国家就占了整个欧洲LNG气化能力的50%左右,LNG只有先在这些国家加工之后,才能再通过管道运到其他内陆欧洲国家。分布不均也将导致诸多问题。例如,有消息显示,近几个月,英国对欧洲大陆的几个管道基本上都处在闲置状态,似乎英国先将天然气留给了本国。

日本今年可能也将面临异常寒冷的冬天,马石油的沙巴(Sabah)-砂勞越(Sarawak)的管道9月21日遭到土石流的衝擊而產生洩漏,无法提供天然气给日本。 亚洲很难有大量的冗余能源供应给欧洲。












天然气在2021年和2022年的高价格,真的是逼欧洲去工业化。 



Saturday 1 October 2022

英国股债汇三杀



2013年1月23日,英国前首相卡梅伦David Cameron提出“脱欧”公投。 

2016年6月23日最终公投计票结果,支持“脱欧”选民票数17,176,006票,占总投票数52%。支持“留欧”选民票数15,952,444票,占总数48%。

2017年3月16日英国女王伊丽莎白二世批准“脱欧”法案,授权英国首相特雷莎·梅正式启动“脱欧”程序。

2017年3月29日英国首相特雷莎·梅致函欧盟,正式开启英国“脱欧”程序。

2018年6月26日批准英国首相特蕾莎·梅的“脱欧”法案,正式允许英国脱离欧盟。

2019年5月24日英国首相特蕾莎·梅Theresa May在唐宁街十号正式宣布辞职并发表演讲。

2019年7月24日约翰逊Boris Johnson正式成为英国新一任首相。

2019年10月17曰欧盟委员会主席容克宣布,欧盟委员会与英国政府就英国“脱欧”达成协议。

2020年1月30日,欧洲联盟正式批准英国脱欧。

2021年12月16日,英国央行就开始加息。 利息是0.25%

2022年7月6日,约翰逊Boris Johnson被迫宣布辞职。 

2022年9月5日,英国外交大臣特拉斯Liz Truss赢得选举,继而成为英国新一任首相。

2022年9月14日,英国央行再继续加息2码,利息是2.25%。

2022年9月14日,英国央行宣布要在10月3日开始每年减持800亿英镑英国国债的QT计划。

2022年9月25日,特拉斯政府宣布最近50年来最大规模的减税方案,£45 billion,实现的经济增长

2022年9月26日,投资人认为英国没有控制通货膨胀。减税方案会正增长未来预算赤字和公共债务水平。投资人开始抛售英镑及英国国债,英镑兑美元创历史新低, 1.042。 

2022年9月28日,英国央行宣布从9月28日到10月14日(13个工作日),无限量购买购买英国政府长期国债(剩余年限超过20年的国债),£65 billion,以解除英国国债危机。这次行动将由英国财政部全责担保。 市场把这项行动解读成QE。每年减持800亿英镑英国国债的QT推迟到10月31日才开始。 

根据杨世光在金钱爆的分析,9月26日(一),英国和全球资产因为国债的暴跌,有重新定价(repricing)。英国30年期国债的殖利率创下2002年来的新高。投注者说,买卖债券变得困难,因为没有要买高波动和风险的资产。 英国的养老金(Pension)的投资策列是负债驱动的投资(liability-driven investment (LDI)。养老金的投资多数买长期国债。

当长期国债的殖利率下跌时,养老基金保持保证金。 

长期国债的殖利率上升时,养老基金需要提供更多的抵押品,以保持保证金。 

9月23日(星期一),长期国债的殖利率飙升,升投资银行要求养老基金经理卖国债,股票和英国开放式的房产基金,以确保LDI的户口不会中Margin call. 如果9月28日英国央行没有进行干预,国债收益率或将从4.5%飙升至7%-8%。在这种情况下,大约90%的英国养老金将耗尽抵押品,他们会破产。

对于英国糟糕的财政政策,穆迪还警告称,英国政府大规模的、没有资金补充的减税计划会危及其信贷评级,威胁到英国在投资者中的信誉。英国政府本希望以“迷你预算”来提振即将陷入衰退的英国经济,但这种由债务支撑的财政刺激措施只会加剧英国的高通胀,反而不利于经济的增长。英国也是目前欧洲地缘风险下高通胀的一个受害者。只要美联储不停止加息,英国经济基本面还继续恶化的话,英镑可能还会再进一步下行,再次创下历史新低。

英国可能会是2022年另外一只黑天鹅。 

Saturday 24 September 2022

#5/22美联储FED加息0.75%

 美联储又加息3码。

在9月21日加息前,市场开始有消息说会加息4码。我还是认为,最多加息3码。因为美联储没有必要一次加4码,吓唬市场。现在的美国利率来到3%-3.25%. 美联储在今年的11月和12月都会开会。

从美联储的会议记录里,可以看到他们要把通货膨胀降到2%。

LIBOR利率(London Interbank Offered Rate,简写LIBOR )即伦敦同业无担保拆借利率是在1985年设立。它是指伦敦的第一流银行之间短期资金借贷的利率,是国际金融市场中大多数浮动利率基础利率。伦敦银行对5个货币定制短期贷款利率。这5个货币是美元,英镑,日元,欧元和瑞郎。

2021年12月31日之后,立即停止所有英镑、欧元、瑞士法郎、日元,以及1周和2个月期美元LIBOR报价。2023年6月30日之后所有剩余期限美元利率终止报价。 

LIBOR是离岸美元最重要的市场基准利率。离岸美元浮动利率贷款、浮动利率债券、利率衍生品多以LIBOR为参考利率。甚至很多美国在岸市场金融产品也将LIBOR作为参考利率。

美国以有担保隔夜融资利率(SOFR)替代美元LIBOR。SOFR是纽约联邦储备银行和美国财政部金融研究办公室共同编制的新基准利率,于2018年4月正式推出,由纽约联储担任管理人。SOFR基于隔夜国债回购交易生成,对应市场日均交易基础超过1万亿美元。

SOFR是国债回购交易的利率,不包含信用风险,可能无法准确反映金融机构真实的融资成本。Bader(2019)指出,如果出现金融危机,资金涌向美债等避险资产,SOFR利率可能不升反降,但无担保利率会大幅上升。此时,如果金融机构缺乏足够的抵押品,但其资产以SOFR为定价基准,就可能出现负债成本大幅上升的情况,但资产回报率没有随之上升的情况。

我个人认为,LIBOR终结,被SORF取代。这是改写美元拆借利率的权利方和算法。所以,对美元货币,应该去搞懂SORF。那些解释LIBOR的书,可以不用读,以免用旧视角看美元拆借利率。

Recent indicators point to modest growth in spending and production. Job gains have been robust in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Inflation remains elevated, reflecting supply and demand imbalances related to the pandemic, higher food and energy prices, and broader price pressures.

Russia's war against Ukraine is causing tremendous human and economic hardship. The war and related events are creating additional upward pressure on inflation and are weighing on global economic activity. The Committee is highly attentive to inflation risks.

The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 3 to 3-1/4 percent and anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in May. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective.

In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals. The Committee's assessments will take into account a wide range of information, including readings on public health, labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial and international developments.

Voting for the monetary policy action were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michael S. Barr; Michelle W. Bowman; Lael Brainard; James Bullard; Susan M. Collins; Lisa D. Cook; Esther L. George; Philip N. Jefferson; Loretta J. Mester; and Christopher J. Waller.

Implementation Note issued September 21, 2022

Thursday 8 September 2022

#2/22欧洲央行加息0.75%

 欧洲央行将三大主要利率均上调75个基点,符合市场预期,为1999年来首次大幅加息75个基点。

欧洲央行紧急抗疫购债计划(PEPP)的再投资将至少持续至2024年末。欧洲央行表示,在未来几次会议上,管理委员会预计将进一步提高利率,以抑制需求。

欧洲央行表示,在2022年上半年出现反弹后,近期数据显示欧元区经济增长大幅放缓,预计经济将在今年晚些时候和2023年第一季度陷入停滞。



#3/22大马国行加息0.25%

 国家银行下午宣布将隔夜政策利率(OPR)调高25个基点,至2.50%,但没有对马股掀起太大涟漪。富时综合指数周四闭市报1494.73点,上升3.38点或0.23%。


Wednesday 7 September 2022

马币贬值 1USD=RM4.50

美元是国际储备金的货币之一。 美元走强到2000年4月的新高。但是,全世界其他货币都在跌。 马币也跌到1USD=RM4.50。

1997年,金融风暴席卷亚洲,马币6个月暴跌46%,7月1日达到4.885的历史低位。

为应对马币贬值,1998年9月1日,马来西亚政府宣布将马币与美元挂钩,把两者之间的汇率固定在1美元兑3.8马币的水平,直至2005年7月21日开始放开管制并允许马币汇率浮动。
















Saturday 3 September 2022

2022年石油的故事

以下石油的介绍,来自知乎。 

世界上目前有三种主要的石油基准价,Brent,WTI 和Dubai or Oman

分别代表着三个全球最大的石油出口地区及他们所覆盖的市场,Brent代表产自北海的石油(包括Brent, Forties, Oseberg and Ekofisk四个海域),且原油质量较高,重度轻且含硫少,适合提取汽油、柴油、以及其他高要求的石油制品。且由于是在海上开采,方便海路运输,其价格一直具有优势。Brent是全球最主要的石油基准价系统,三分之二的原油期货合约依据Brent定价

WTI是west Texas Intermedia 的缩写,即产自美国的石油,其质量比Brent更好,轻质且含硫更少,是提炼汽油的优质选择,但由于是内陆油田生产,向海外运输费用较高,其价格相对于Brent没有优势,主要是美国国内使用,但由于美国2014年的页岩油技术提升,使其产量大升成本降低,促使全球油价大幅下跌,美国石油变得很有竞争力。

Dubai/Oman,即中东国家产的石油,主要是OPEC石油输出国产的石油,其质量较低一些,重度较大,含硫量比较高,不宜用作汽油提取,主要供应亚洲市场,OPEC国家的石油储备是世界总量的70%,因此对市场价格影响也很大。

Brent Crude Oil 

2022年9月3日的价格是USD93








2020年4月21日,受2020年石油价格战影响,美国5月WTI原油期货收盘暴跌306%,首次降为负值。

WTI Crude Oil

2022年9月3日的价格是USD87

2022年,俄罗斯和乌克兰的战争在2月24日开始后,石油的价格就因为供应减少,而往上涨。 

2022年3月1日, 美国总统拜登3月31日宣布,未来六个月将从美国战略石油储备中每天释放100万桶石油、累计释放1.8亿桶,以应对目前供应短缺、油价高企的局面,并称这是美国史上最大规模的石油储备释放。

2022年7月15日,美国总统拜登会试图说服沙特阿拉伯增加石油黑金的产量,以期减缓油价的飙升和通货膨胀。

2022年8月3日, 由石油输出国组织欧佩克(OPEC)和非欧佩克产油国组成的联盟“欧佩克+”(OPEC+)同意在9月将日均原油供应配额上调10万桶。不过报道指出,这只相当于全球石油需求的0.1%。

2022年9月1日,七国集团(G7)财长在一份联合声明中确认,同意对俄罗斯石油及石油产品设定“价格上限”,G7还呼吁“所有国家”加入该项倡议。G7在声明中并提及限价的详细机制,但设定了两个非常明确的目标:一个是希望借此限制全球油价上涨,减轻通胀压力;二是限制俄罗斯的石油销售收入,从而打击该国的经济。在G7声明发布后,油价短线冲高,美、布两油日内涨幅扩大至约3%。
为了实现上述目标,G7将围绕石油和石油产品价格进行制定新机制,若等于或低于目标水平,将允许一些国家购买俄罗斯石油。如果价格超过商定的上限,G7将禁止对装载俄罗斯石油的船只提供保险和融资等服务。俄罗斯将停止向那些对其石油设定价格上限的公司或者国家供应石油和石油产品,因为俄方不会在非市场条件下工作。俄罗斯总统新闻秘书佩斯科夫周五也表示,俄罗斯不会向那些支持对俄石油限价的国家供应石油。

Wednesday 31 August 2022

逆向投资

 大马KLSE在2022年年头还有1600点。5月5日的收市是1582点。 然后就是一路跌,跌到1400点。 

现在的收益,比起5月5日时,差好多。 

当时,大家都以为国门开放,市场恢复。但是,俄罗斯和乌克兰的战争,美联储连续在6月15日和7月27日,各加息0.75%。直接把马股打趴到地。

GE15还不来。国内政治一片乱象。 大选不来,国行就没有采取积极的加息行动。然后,马币贬值。 

我手上还是有些股票。需要亏钱脱手。把握现金。 

当市场狂热,股票涨,赚钱时,就要准备离开。 当时,贪心。想多赚。其实,应该拿回本钱。  

结果,9月头才要离场,赚的都变成不赚,还要去亏那些本来就亏的。 

保本第一。这次又是个教训。

鲍威尔8月26日美联储年度政策峰会的演说

我看Youtube台湾杨世光金钱爆的影片。 他特低提醒观众仔细去读美联储主席鲍威尔(Jerome Powell)的演说。

鲍威尔8月26日,8分钟的演说后,美国三大指数应声狂泻。道琼斯工业平均指数下跌超过1,000点;纳斯达克综合指数下跌近500点;标准普尔500指数下跌了140多点。

所有这三个指数的跌幅都超过了3%,但仍均略高于一个月前的水平。在近一段时间里的上涨幅度,大部分都在周五被抹去。

August 26, 2022

Monetary Policy and Price Stability

Chair Jerome H. Powell

At “Reassessing Constraints on the Economy and Policy,” an economic policy symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today.

At past Jackson Hole conferences, I have discussed broad topics such as the ever-changing structure of the economy and the challenges of conducting monetary policy under high uncertainty. Today, my remarks will be shorter, my focus narrower, and my message more direct.

The Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) overarching focus right now is to bring inflation back down to our 2 percent goal. Price stability is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve and serves as the bedrock of our economy. Without price stability, the economy does not work for anyone. In particular, without price stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all. The burdens of high inflation fall heaviest on those who are least able to bear them.

Restoring price stability will take some time and requires using our tools forcefully to bring demand and supply into better balance. Reducing inflation is likely to require a sustained period of below-trend growth. Moreover, there will very likely be some softening of labor market conditions. While higher interest rates, slower growth, and softer labor market conditions will bring down inflation, they will also bring some pain to households and businesses. These are the unfortunate costs of reducing inflation. But a failure to restore price stability would mean far greater pain.

The U.S. economy is clearly slowing from the historically high growth rates of 2021, which reflected the reopening of the economy following the pandemic recession. While the latest economic data have been mixed, in my view our economy continues to show strong underlying momentum. The labor market is particularly strong, but it is clearly out of balance, with demand for workers substantially exceeding the supply of available workers. Inflation is running well above 2 percent, and high inflation has continued to spread through the economy. While the lower inflation readings for July are welcome, a single month's improvement falls far short of what the Committee will need to see before we are confident that inflation is moving down.

We are moving our policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. At our most recent meeting in July, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 2.25 to 2.5 percent, which is in the Summary of Economic Projection's (SEP) range of estimates of where the federal funds rate is projected to settle in the longer run. In current circumstances, with inflation running far above 2 percent and the labor market extremely tight, estimates of longer-run neutral are not a place to stop or pause.

July's increase in the target range was the second 75 basis point increase in as many meetings, and I said then that another unusually large increase could be appropriate at our next meeting. We are now about halfway through the intermeeting period. Our decision at the September meeting will depend on the totality of the incoming data and the evolving outlook. At some point, as the stance of monetary policy tightens further, it likely will become appropriate to slow the pace of increases.

Restoring price stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some time. The historical record cautions strongly against prematurely loosening policy. Committee participants' most recent individual projections from the June SEP showed the median federal funds rate running slightly below 4 percent through the end of 2023. Participants will update their projections at the September meeting.

Our monetary policy deliberations and decisions build on what we have learned about inflation dynamics both from the high and volatile inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, and from the low and stable inflation of the past quarter-century. In particular, we are drawing on three important lessons.

The first lesson is that central banks can and should take responsibility for delivering low and stable inflation. It may seem strange now that central bankers and others once needed convincing on these two fronts, but as former Chairman Ben Bernanke has shown, both propositions were widely questioned during the Great Inflation period.1 Today, we regard these questions as settled. Our responsibility to deliver price stability is unconditional. It is true that the current high inflation is a global phenomenon, and that many economies around the world face inflation as high or higher than seen here in the United States. It is also true, in my view, that the current high inflation in the United States is the product of strong demand and constrained supply, and that the Fed's tools work principally on aggregate demand. None of this diminishes the Federal Reserve's responsibility to carry out our assigned task of achieving price stability. There is clearly a job to do in moderating demand to better align with supply. We are committed to doing that job.

The second lesson is that the public's expectations about future inflation can play an important role in setting the path of inflation over time. Today, by many measures, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored. That is broadly true of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, and of market-based measures as well. But that is not grounds for complacency, with inflation having run well above our goal for some time.

If the public expects that inflation will remain low and stable over time, then, absent major shocks, it likely will. Unfortunately, the same is true of expectations of high and volatile inflation. During the 1970s, as inflation climbed, the anticipation of high inflation became entrenched in the economic decisionmaking of households and businesses. The more inflation rose, the more people came to expect it to remain high, and they built that belief into wage and pricing decisions. As former Chairman Paul Volcker put it at the height of the Great Inflation in 1979, "Inflation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of inflationary expectations."2

One useful insight into how actual inflation may affect expectations about its future path is based in the concept of "rational inattention."3 When inflation is persistently high, households and businesses must pay close attention and incorporate inflation into their economic decisions. When inflation is low and stable, they are freer to focus their attention elsewhere. Former Chairman Alan Greenspan put it this way: "For all practical purposes, price stability means that expected changes in the average price level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not materially enter business and household financial decisions."4

Of course, inflation has just about everyone's attention right now, which highlights a particular risk today: The longer the current bout of high inflation continues, the greater the chance that expectations of higher inflation will become entrenched.

That brings me to the third lesson, which is that we must keep at it until the job is done. History shows that the employment costs of bringing down inflation are likely to increase with delay, as high inflation becomes more entrenched in wage and price setting. The successful Volcker disinflation in the early 1980s followed multiple failed attempts to lower inflation over the previous 15 years. A lengthy period of very restrictive monetary policy was ultimately needed to stem the high inflation and start the process of getting inflation down to the low and stable levels that were the norm until the spring of last year. Our aim is to avoid that outcome by acting with resolve now.

These lessons are guiding us as we use our tools to bring inflation down. We are taking forceful and rapid steps to moderate demand so that it comes into better alignment with supply, and to keep inflation expectations anchored. We will keep at it until we are confident the job is done.